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Abstract
On August 12, 1676, Benjamin Church, an English colonizer and military leader,
led a company of Englishmen and Indian allies in an attack on a group of Wampanoags
with the goal of killing the Wampanoag sachem known as Metacomet, Metacom, or King
Philip. According to colonial records, the attack took place at Mount Hope in Bristol,
Rhode Island during King Philip’s War. This conflict began in southern Massachusetts in
June 1675 and eventually engulfed most of New England. The Wampanoags and English
fought on opposing sides.
This study will analyze the attack that resulted in Philip’s death, guided by the
question: How did the colonial forces, with their Indian allies, defeat the group of
Wampanoags they fell upon? The major argument that underlies this study is that Indian
war tactics- adopted by the English in the final and fatal attack on Philip, rather than a
disparity in weaponry between the two sides- helped assure the military victory. The
relative equity in military hardware supports the assertion that the use of Indian war
tactics was more influential than advanced weaponry in determining battle victories.
Investigation of these questions is difficult due to a lack of Native American
written accounts of the attack. The problem is partially remedied using archaeological
evidence. The colonial weapons buried with Native Americans at a seventeenth-century
Wampanoag burial ground suggests a level of value attributed to them, and supports
historic accounts of the Indians' use of colonial weapons during King Philip's War. This
study will also examine how King Philip's War, specifically the attack which resulted in
Philip's death, is remembered today and how the conflict fits into the broader history of
colonial Rhode Island.

Chapter One introduces the study. Chapter Two details what historians and
researchers have argued about the reasons for colonial victory. Chapter Three is a cultural
comparison of weapons and war tactics between the English and Native Americans. It
will demonstrate that Native Americans adopted and mastered European weapons, which
helped level the wartime playing field and narrowed military discrepancies. This in turn
suggests that other factors- such as the adoption of Native American war tactics- more
heavily contributed to battle victories. Chapter Four focuses on archaeology; it details the
archaeological study of Burr’s Hill, a seventeenth-century Wampanoag burial ground.
Chapter Five analyzes the final attack on Philip using historical and archaeological
evidence and demonstrates the use of Native American military tactics by the English
colonists and their Native American allies; it also explains the archaeological significance
of the site where Philip allegedly fell. Chapter Six discusses how the attack and the
overall war is remembered in Rhode Island with writings, monuments and events.
Chapter Seven is the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Mayflower departed England and made way for the New World in 1620.1 She
carried 102 English passengers considered to be Separatists, the people on the very fringe
of the Puritan movement. Puritans rejected the Church of England and desired to purge
the church of all unnecessary rituals and expenses; they desired simpler lives.2 As people
who had resolved to draw away from the Church of England rather than working for a
change within the established church, they were considered radicals.3
Massasoit, the Wampanoag leader, greeted the pilgrims in 1621.4 Fifty- four years
later his son Metacom would go to war against the English. It’s not entirely clear why or
how the war started when it did, but once it began it was virtually merciless.5 The
Wampanoags, Narragansetts, Nipmucks, Pocomtucks and Abenakis attacked and burned
English towns and slaughtered its inhabitants; the English, with occasional aid from
Mohegans, Pequots, Mohawks and Christian Indians, burned, murdered and sold
prisoners into slavery.6 Jill Lepore, professor of American history at Harvard University,
argues that “both sides practiced torture, and mutilation of the dead.”7 Ultimately, the
English colonists were victorious.

1

Nathaniel Philbrick, Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War (New York: Viking, 2006), xiv.
Bert Lippincott, reference librarian and genealogist at the Newport Historical Society, telephone
interview by author, Oct. 20, 2018.
3
Philbrick, 4.
4
Ibid., xiv.
5
Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity, (New York: Vintage,
1999), 7.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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There were a number of factors which led to the colonial victory in King Philip's
War. Writers, historians and researchers have allotted varying amounts of weight to these
factors. Some Englishmen who wrote during and immediately after the war attributed the
colonial victory to God. Some contemporary historians and researchers argue for the
English superiority in weapons; while others more heavily attribute the colonists’ success
on their adoption and successful execution of Indian war tactics.
The colonial and Indian forces both had sufficient arsenals. There is evidence that
Indians readily adopted colonial guns and used them to supplement their aboriginal
arsenal. Whatever benefits the guns offered, the Indians reaped; they grew skilled and
efficient in their use. Firearms, especially flintlock muskets, were an excellent addition to
their forest warfare. Their possession of guns coupled with their knowledge of the land
and hunting skills made the Indians a particularly strong threat. Yet the colonists
ultimately won the war. With a sufficient arsenal and acute forest warfare skills, why did
the Indians lose King Philip's War? For most of the Indians, defeat translated to
enslavement following the war, seizure of their land and colonial control of the historical
narrative.
Historians have highlighted the various factors that contributed to the colonial
victory in King Philip's War. I argue that Indian-style war tactics adopted by the English
more heavily contributed to the colonial victory, more so than a wide discrepancy in
weapons between the two sides. This is because both the Indians and English were
relatively even-handed when it came to their arsenals. In the final and fatal attack on
Philip, Benjamin Church and his soldiers used the Indian-style war tactic of ambush to
target and kill Philip and capture his band of followers. The war waned and ended shortly
2

thereafter. I combine historical, archaeological and cultural landscape evidence to provide
a more holistic examination of the importance of military tactics in King Philip's War and
how the war is remembered today.
A Note on Names
I use words like English, Indian, Native American, colonist, native inhabitant and
indigenous people to identify and describe the seventeenth-century people I analyzed in
this study. Indian was a hard word to settle on; since the word is coined by the English it
felt less authentic and more offensive, but it is the word used by many scholars of
American history. Plus, it’s a word employed by some descendants of indigenous people
in Rhode Island today.8 Colonist, native inhabitant and indigenous people felt appropriate
and sensitive. But identity, really, is too complex for words. Christine DeLucia, an
associate professor of history at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts,
who researches and teaches early American history and indigenous studies with a focus
on race, ethnicity and colonialism, wrote in “The Memory Frontier” of the Sacred Run
and Paddle, a commemorative event on October 30, 2010. The event commemorated the
forced removal of Nipmuc and other Eastern Algonquian peoples from their homes to
Deer Island in Boston Harbor, where they were confined during the winter of 1675–1676.
At the event, “not one participant identified foremost as Indian,” Christine DeLucia
wrote. “They called themselves Nipmuc, Wampanoag (Mashpee or Aquinnah),
Ponkapoag, Abenaki, Penobscot.”9 Whenever possible, the Native Americans referred to
in this text will be allotted their tribal affiliations, but when specific identification is not
8

Narragansett Indian Tribe, “The Narragansett Indian Tribe,” Narragansett Indian Tribe, accessed
November 20, 2018, NarragansettIndianNation.org.
9
Christine DeLucia, “The Memory Frontier: Uncommon Pursuits of Past and Place in the Northeast after
King Philip’s War,” The Journal of American History 98 (March 2012): 977.
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possible, the words Indian or Native American will be used. These words aren’t perfect,
but many words fail to encapsulate the complexities and nuances of a person or a people.
DeLucia wrote: “In the realm of lived experience there has rarely been a coherent
American identity, and certainly not a monolithic Indian one, but instead finer-grained
levels of loyalty and comprehension where memories are plural and shifting.”10
Wampanoag can be thought of as designating a united political group of territorial
village units, bounded on the west by Narragansett Bay and the Pawtuxet River; to the
east was the Atlantic Ocean. The Wampanoag included the inhabitants of Martha's
Vineyard, Nantucket, and Aquidneck Island.11 There were nine territorial subdivisions
which comprised the federation of Wampanoag, the leading division being Pokanoket,
home of the supreme sachem, Massasoit (otherwise known as Ousamequin).12 Out of all
the New England aboriginal tribes in the seventeenth century, this study focuses on the
Wampanoags.
It is hard to limit war and its effects on the people who experienced it in words.
Even the labeling of the events that are here discussed as “King Philip's War” is
problematic. Some argue the conflict be called a “Puritan Conquest” while others
champion the name “Metacom's Rebellion,” insisting Philip is more accurately referred
to by his Algonquian name, Metacom (also rendered “Metacomet” or “Pometacom”);
others insist the seventeenth-century events be referred to as an Indian civil war.13 Jill
Lepore argues that all wars have at least two names; what most Americans call the “Civil
10

Ibid.
Christina B. Johannsen, , “European Trade Goods and Wampanoag Culture in the Seventeenth Century,”
in Burr’s Hill, a 17th Century Wampanoag burial ground in Warren, Rhode Island, ed. Susan Gibson, Studies
in anthropology and material culture (Providence, Rhode Island: Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology,
Brown University, 1980), 25.
12
Ibid.
13
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War” has been called by northerners “The War of the Rebellion” and by southerners the
“War of Northern Aggression.” Lepore argues that “names of wars are always biased;
they always privilege one perspective over another.”14
My words are flawed, but most are.

14

Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORIOGRAPHY
Different centuries yield different writers and different trends regarding the
descriptions of events. Though an entire group of people and their complex emotions and
thoughts can't be discerned wholly and accurately from the writings of only a certain
number of them, written records grant glimpses into the mentalities of individuals, who
are, at least partially, products of their environment.
The colonial-era scribes argued that the violent confrontations in King Philip’s
War were won or lost due to divine will. As the years progressed, writers emerged who
had not experienced the war first-hand but heard and read narratives. These writers
examined the war through a difference cultural lens and offered evaluations only possible
with hindsight. Nineteenth century writers did not attribute the colonial victory so heavily
to divine intervention; they outlined other reasons for the Indian defeat, like the adoption
of aboriginal military techniques by the colonists and their recruitment of Native
American soldiers. Arguments defining either weapon sophistication or military tactics as
the most definitive variables in wartime victories are popular among twenty and twentyfirst century writers, but the twenty and twenty-first century historiographies are even
more varied than previous centuries. This chapter will examine how writers in different
centuries interpreted the war, starting with the earliest writers in the seventeenth century.

6

Interpretations of the war by seventeenth-century writers
More than four hundred letters written during the war survive in New England
archives alone; there are more than thirty editions of twenty different printed accounts.
Though the early historiography of the war is extensive, no one narrative emerged among
the seventeenth-century writers of King Philip’s War.15 The historiography of the war
began immediately after the war ended, before the trials concluded and the enslavement
and death sentences to the indigenous people were carried out. Why did the colonists
write about their experiences and their thoughts and feelings, and why were their
accounts published so quickly?
In part, writing serves as an organizational tool for human thoughts; it’s a method
of understanding and explaining events that are difficult to reconcile, such as war. Words,
definitions and explanations make life- a seemingly limitless phenomenon- more limited.
Writing serves as an organizational outlet for the thoughts that seemingly have no end or
limits in the human mind or in oral communication; writing requires the production of
tangible evidence, and tangible evidence for the colonists meant something concrete for
them to hold onto in the midst of such chaos. In part, the act of transcribing their
experiences helped the colonists on individual levels make sense of what happened.
Defining and transcribing King Philip’s War also allowed the colonists to gain control of
the historical narrative. The written records coupled with the extermination or
enslavement of the indigenous people encouraged later generations to rely heavily on
colonial accounts to piece together and understand what created, sustained and ended the
conflict known as King Philip’s War.

15
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Increase Mather was not a soldier in King Philip’s War, but he was an associate of
most of the colonial leadership and was considered a spiritual advisor to the war effort.16
Mather’s A Brief History of the Warr was first published in Boston in 1676.17 Mather
writes that he pulled from his diary entries to put A Brief History together; diary entries
that he penned in the midst of the conflict. His history documents events through 1676
(hostilities in southern, central and western New England ended that year, though fighting
continued in areas of Maine until 1678).18 Mather claims he wrote the history in the first
place because two other accounts of the war were mistaken; he acts the part of the
righteous historian, claiming to provide an accurate and un-biased history for readers.19
Mather writes that King Philip’s War happened because the colonists failed to
please God. He calls the sins of the colonists ripe; they deserved so “dreadfull a
judgment” as a war.20 The war happened because the next “Generation” did not doggedly
pursue “the blessed design of their Fathers, in following the Lord into this Wilderness.”21
He reasons that certain events happened because of divine intervention. Mather details
the tragic tale of John Sausaman, an Indian who apparently betrayed Philip and confided
in the English in 1674. Sausaman was subsequently murdered and three Indians were
found guilty for his death. Mather writes: “No doubt but one reason why the Indians
murdered John Sassamon, was out of hatred against him for his Religion, for he was

16

Increase Mather, A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England (1676): An Online
Electronic Text Edition, ed. Paul Royster (Faculty Publications, UNL Libraries),
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/libraryscience/31, abstract.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 3.
20
Ibid., 10.
21
Ibid. Whenever possible the original spellings and capitalizations will be maintained when referencing
colonial accounts, but sometimes modern grammatical tweaks will be made for the sake of clarity and
flow.
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Christianized and baptiz’d, and was a Preacher amongst the Indians.”22 Mather argues
John Sassamon was victimized for his love of God, and this prejudice among the Indian
enemies towards the English faith sparked violence and the onset of the war; he
effectively creates sympathy for the English, absolves them of guilt and paints the
colonists as sympathetic to the Indians who chose to be Christianized.
In one particular instance early in the war, the English tracked King Philip but
abandoned the chase. Mather argues that if the pursuit continued, Philip would have been
captured and the war would have ended, “but though Deliverance was according to all
Humane probability near, God saw it not good for us as yet.”23 Whether right or wrong,
Mather considers the unfolding of events in the New World as pre-destined and entirely
controlled by God; it’s not the fault of the colonists that the war dragged on and the
violence wasn’t immediately snuffed. Mather had faith that despite any instance of
oppression or sorrow “our God will have compassion on us, and this his People shall not
utterly perish.”24 Mather reasons that the war dragged on so God could effectively crush
the soul of King Philip: “Thus hath God brought that grand Enemy into great misery
before he quite destroy him. It must needs be bitter as death to him, to [lose] his Wife and
only Son…and almost all his Subjects and Country too.”25 Mather writes that “God
brought it to pass, chiefly by Indians themselves” when one of Philip’s men fled for
Rhode Island and informed the English that Philip had “returned again to Mount-Hope,
and undertook to bring them to the Swamp where he hid himself.”26 “Divine Providence”
guaranteed that Capt. Church was in Rhode Island to receive the intelligence which
22

Mather, 11.
Ibid., 15.
24
Ibid., 17.
25
Ibid., 69.
26
Ibid., 71.
23
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allowed the Wampanoag sachem to be destroyed, and the war to finally end.27 Mather
claims the “Gospel was freely offered to him, [King Philip] and to his Subjects, but they
despised it.”28 Mather asserts that the war could have been prevented had God been
pleased; the English tried to save the Indians, but they would not listen and so God
passed judgment.29 Mather touts God as the ultimate variable in the colonial victory. He
calls the aboriginal arsenal, specifically bows and arrows, woefully inefficient compared
to the “lethality” of English guns and swords. But eventually the Indians acquired English
firearms; Mather calls the Native Americans “unhappily furnished” with the English
weapons.30 He notes that the acquisition of European weapons put the Indians on an
equal plane with the colonists in terms of killing technology, but Mather asserts weapons
are pawns to God. The Indians lost the war because “the terror of God was upon them.”31
Born in 1639 to a Plymouth carpenter, Benjamin Church was raised to take up his
father’s trade. But when King Philip’s War erupted in 1675, Church joined the colonial
forces as a volunteer officer. He rose in rank and prominence in the Puritan military; his
use of military tactics which were considered unorthodox and largely adapted from
Algonquian influences distinguished him from other puritan leaders. And it was Church
who, as a military captain, was commissioned by Gov. Josiah Winslow to descend upon
Philip and his followers in the final and fatal attack on the Wampanoag sachem on
August 12, 1675.32

27

Ibid., 71-73.
Mather, 89.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid, 10.
31
Ibid.
32
Benjamin Church and Thomas Church, The Entertaining History of King Philip’s War (Early American
Imprints, Series 1, no. 12352), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.uri.idm.oclc.org, 30-31; Philip Gould,
“Reinventing Benjamin Church: Virtue, Citizenship and the History of King Philip’s War in Early National
28
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The Entertaining History of King Philip’s War was composed by Church’s son,
Thomas; Thomas Church transcribed his father’s oral recollections and copied his
wartime diaries to create the narrative.33 In the introduction to the narrative, Church
credits his survival in the war to the “over-ruling hand of the Almighty… I endeavored to
put all my confidence in him, and by his almighty power was carried through every
difficult action.”34 Like Mather, Church attributes all events and outcomes to the will of
God; human choice seems to matter little, since the colonists are essentially acting as
vessels for God’s work and will. This mentality dually helps to absolve the English of
guilt and comfort them, what transpired was no fault of their own but the will of God.
The war was inevitable.
Philip Gould argues that the principal motifs of An Entertaining History are
Church’s heroism and his success in adapting an unorthodox style of military tactics to
seal the Puritan victory.35 Gould writes: “As a tale of military (mis)adventure, its largely
secular appeal- despite its intermittent recourse to the guiding hand of divine Providencedistinguishes it from official histories of the war” like Mather’s history and William
Hubbard’s A Narrative of the Trouble with the Indians in New-England.36 Church exudes
confidence in his military decisions and touts his own innovation and tactical genius.
Even the title of Church’s narrative- an “entertaining” history- alludes to the ensuing
content. The tone of his narrative is more adventurous and fantastical than it is somber

America,” Journal of the Early Republic 16, no. 4 (1996): 646, http://www-jstororg.uri.idm.oclc.org/stable/3124421.
33
Gould, 647.
34
Church et al., iv.
35
Gould, 647.
36
Ibid.
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and a means of post-wartime reconciliation. Church credits God, but he also credits his
military prowess for the colonial victory.
William Hubbard, an orthodox Puritan minister, first published A Narrative in
1676. Like Mather and Church, Hubbard credits God for the colonial victory on August
12, 1676 in Rhode Island. He also credits Church, though Church was acting as a vessel
of God’s will.37 He calls Captain Church’s leadership a “great advantage” in wartime
victories for the colonial forces.38 When Hubbard describes the final and fatal attack on
Philip, he said the Wampanoag sachem was “hunted by the English Forces through the
Woods” until at least “driven to his own Den.”39 Philip and his followers were
surrounded; the swamp they had retreated to “provided but a Prison…till the Messengers
of death, came by Divine permission to execute vengeance upon him.”40 Hubbard asserts
that it was the aggressive and tactical pursuit- military genius- that sealed King Philip’s
fate. Hubbard, in his re-telling of the final and fatal attack, doesn’t focus on the hardware
but on the ambush tactic and allots more weight to that factor than weaponry in
determining the colonial victory. Like other seventeenth-century writers, Hubbard
advances that God is always a pivotal factor in victories, defeats and all other life events.

37

William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England (1677) (Early American
Imprints, Series 1, no. 231), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.uri.idm.oclc.org, 104.
38
Ibid.
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Interpretations of the war by nineteenth-century writers
The colonial revival was a late nineteenth-century movement that encouraged
interest in America's colonial heritage, especially on the East Coast; it tended to foster a
sanitized view of the past “that seemed reassuring and morally sound in an era of rapid
social transformation.”41 Zachariah Allen (1795-1882), the president of the Rhode Island
Historical Society when it was founded in 1822, and speaker and writer on historical
topics, “was a principal architect of public memory during the state's colonial revival.”42
Born in Providence and educated at Brown University, Allen built his fortune through
textile enterprises, yet he remained a devoted champion and advocate for the past.43 Allen
paid homage to the grave site of Benjamin Church in Little Compton and personally
funded renovations for the crumbling grave stone.44 The grassroots efforts in the
centuries proceeding the end of King Philip's War and before the twentieth century to
memorialize the New England landscape was a legacy of Allen's. In a speech given by
Allen before the Rhode Island Historical Society in 1876, the bi-centennial anniversary of
the war, Allen highlights the importance of a cultural landscape in preserving the memory
of a person or group of people. Narragansett Bay “will forever remain a memorial of their
[the Narragansetts] existence,” Allen wrote.45 He describes a region called “Massasoit's
country,” which evolved into “Massachusetts.”46 “If fame can be an offset to wrongs,”
Allen stated, “this old chief is remunerated by affixing his name to one of the present

41

DeLucia, 982.
Ibid.
43
DeLucia, 982.
44
Ibid.
45
Zachariah Allen, Bi-centenary of the Burning of Providence in 1676: Defence of the Rhode Island System
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46
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United States of America.”47 But fame cannot offset wrongs, heal hearts or repair what
was done to the people who inhabited the land before the English colonizers claimed it.
Allen hoped that it might; that bloodshed and lands taken could be reconciled with the
English naming of the stolen land. Citing Connecticut poet L.H. Sigourney, Allen stated
“the red men will never be forgotten, while so many of our States, bays, lakes and rivers,
are indelibly stamped with their names.”48 From a contemporary point of view, we know
this to be false; names can survive the test of time but their origins and meanings can be
forgotten and their significance diminished. Allen argued that “to be remembered and
honored in after ages is the object of human ambition.”49 He recognized the individual
actors in King Philip’s War, both Indian and English, and tried to honor them in the
physical landscape. He states in his address to the Rhode Island Historical Society that
“the fate of a nation depends on the conduct of a few leaders.”50 Allen attributed outcome
more on individual, personal choices- specifically the choices of military leaders- rather
than God, a seventeenth-century trend.
Like Allen, George Bodge valued the fighters in King Philip’s War. Bodge
focused on military veterans in his analysis of the conflict; he released his first edition of
Soldiers in King Philip's War in 1892. His work was an effort to shed light on forgotten
colonial military heroes who fought in King Philip's War. He identified soldiers, military
committees and scouts in his lists of men who served the English cause.51 At a eulogy for
Philip at the Odeon in Boston in 1836, Indian Rev. William Apess (also spelled “Apes”)
called Philip a martyr and one who will be remembered by his descendants. Though his
47
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fight was unsuccessful, King Philip’s War was “as glorious as the American
Revolution”52 and he described Philip as “the greatest man that ever lived upon the
American shores.”53 Like Bodge, Apess highlighted the importance of main actorspeople in leadership roles or prominent positions- in determining the outcomes of violent
encounters. Apess said Philip would have been victorious “had it not been for Indians
who were hired to fight against other Indians…though they [the pilgrims]54 must
acknowledge, that without the aid of Indians and their guides, they must inevitably have
been swept off.”55 The pilgrims, also, deceived the Indians “as their word has never been
fulfilled in regard to Indian rights” and it was through deception “that the pilgrims gained
the country.”56 Apess asserted that the English were only victorious because they
recruited Indian soldiers and used Indian military intelligence, and they secured these
resources by promising the Indians land and life after the war, which they failed to give
them.
Interpretations of the war by twenty and twenty-first century writers
Many twenty and twenty-first century researchers acknowledge the power of
written accounts, military leaders, military strategies, and technology in their analyses of
factors that contributed to the colonial victory. The hallmark of the King Philip's War
historiography in the twenty and twenty-first centuries is its depth and nuances compared
to previous centuries. There’s acknowledgement that King Philip’s War was complex and
the reasons for colonial victory multi-faceted.

52

William Apess, Euology on King Philip, As Pronounced at the Odeon in Federal Street, Boston, by the Rev.
William Apes, an Indian (Gale, 2012), 6.
53
Ibid., 26.
54
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Modern, general studies of Rhode Island history offer various interpretations of
King Philip's War. In Colonial Rhode Island: A History, Sydney V. James argues that the
English colonists' hunger for land sparked the conflict.57 James argues that the English
colonial victory in the attack on Philip was significantly aided by a divided Native
American population, which echoes Apess; the Narragansetts attempted to find comrades
in the Sakonnet branch of the Wampanoags only to find that they had allied with the
English colonists. Eventually, “the Indian peoples who lived around Narragansett Bay
were...exterminating each other.”58 William G. McLoughlin in Rhode Island: A History
offers a similar interpretation. McLoughlin argues that Rhode Islanders “saw the war as
an aggressive effort by the Puritan colonies seeking to secure their claims to the land of
the Wampanoags and Narragansetts.”59 He emphasizes the divisions among the Native
Americans. For example, in July 1676 the Wampanoags “failed to gain the help they
sought from the Mohawks,” and Philip was killed the next month.60 Patrick T. Conley
argues for the importance of leaders in securing wartime victories. In his work Rhode
Island's Founders: From Settlement to Statehood, Conley recounts the colonial history of
Rhode Island by focusing on influential figures. In “Part I: The Pioneers,” he includes
Native American leaders such as Massasoit and King Philip. Conley argues that the tides
of war shifted in favor of the colonial forces in the spring of 1676 largely because of their
“many Indian allies” and Philip's failure to unite local tribes to fight for him.61 Charles
Carroll's Rhode Island: Three Centuries of Democracy, published in 1932, is an

57
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authoritative work on the history of the state that comprises four volumes. Carroll asserts
that military tactics secured battle victories. In Volume I, Carroll argues that King Philip's
War could have potentially been snuffed out “almost in the borning” if the English
organized a military movement promptly and with “vigor and thoroughness.”62 Carroll
asserts that the conflict ended when the colonists “undertook to carry the war to the
Indians” through ambushes.63

Francis Jennings argues in The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and
the Cant of Conquest that determinist theories attributing military victories to forces
beyond human control are the products of people who wish to absolve themselves of any
remorse in regards to the conquering of another group of people.64 The determinist
theories of seventeenth-century writers attribute victory to God; a force that's beyond
human and a force that makes victory pre-destined. Jennings argues that human choices
determine military victories, and he allots ample credit to the power of colonial written
narratives in securing victory. Jennings writes that European “invaders” to colonial-era
America:

...anticipated, correctly, that other Europeans would question the morality of their enterprise.
They therefore made preparations of two sorts: guns and munitions to overpower Indian
resistance and quantities of propaganda to overpower their countrymen's scruples. The
propaganda gradually took standard form as an ideology with conventional assumptions and
semantics. We live with it still.65
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He acknowledges the importance of material resources- guns and munitions- to
physically quell and eventually overwhelm the Indians, but written propaganda played a
role in war too. Jennings argues that the English colonists engaged in the “pervasive
calculated deception of the official records.”66 Of the power of human agency and written
narratives, he writes:

Persons and groups reaching for illicit power customarily assume attitudes of great moral
rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment of their own moral standards of behavior.
Deception of the multitude becomes necessary to sustain power, and the deception of others
rapidly progresses to deception of self. All conquest atrocities have followed such paths. It would
be incredible if ours had not.67

James Drake, in his work King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 16751676, maintains that it should not be assumed that the English and the Native Americans
had inevitably been headed toward a violent confrontation.68 “Inevitability,” he claims,
assumes a force beyond human control that initiated the fighting. In writing his book,
Drake contends that the outcome of the violent intermingling between colonists and
original inhabitants depended more upon human choices and motives than upon
impersonal forces.69 Drake argues that many historians make the colonial victory seem
inevitable by pointing to factors such as numbers, technology, access to supplies and
culture.70 But Drake maintains that neither the size of an army nor its access to
technology and supplies necessarily determines success. During the Vietnam War:
“American forces ostensibly had superior weaponry and finances and won the majority of
battles, yet ultimately they suffered defeat. Such examples raise doubts about the
66

Ibid., vii.
Ibid., 23.
68
James Drake, King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1999), 3.
69
Ibid.
70
Drake, 3.
67

18

common perception that the English inevitably defeated the Indians because of their
military superiority.”71 Drake acknowledges the complexity of war and the many factors
at play. He generally takes more of a micro stance and focuses on the influential power of
the individual.

Armstrong Starkey, another proponent of human agency, argues that the adoption
of aboriginal war tactics by the colonists secured the colonial victory. He writes in
European and Native American Warfare: 1675-1815, that King Philip's War was “the
first major war in which the Indians matched their European opponents in firearms.”72
Mather acknowledged this as well.73 Since European military institutions proved to be
“insufficiently flexible to meet the challenges of the frontier,”74 some European
commanders “incorporated Indian allies into their forces and adopted to the Indian way
of war.”75 Again, this reflects an older argument made by Apess.76 Coupled with the
colonists' advantages in material resources supplied by England- which could sustain
prolonged fighting- the English colonists secured the victory in King Philip's War.77

Malone, on the other hand, argues for the inevitability of the conflict, which
reflects Thomas Church’s seventeenth-century argument. But Malone asserts inevitability
was not the work of God, as Church maintained. In The Skulking Way of War:
Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians, Malone writes:
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The ultimate defeat of the hostile tribes was inevitable long before the death of the man whom the
English called King Philip. The Indians' tactical successes and their skillful use of European
military technology were not enough to win a war against the far more numerous colonists, whose
Indian allies, fortified garrison houses, and almost unlimited logistical support tipped the scales
heavily.78

Malone considers Indian military tactics and the skillful adoption of European weapons
by the aboriginal inhabitants as micro factors; products of human choice. Though
beneficial for the Native Americans, Malone argues that these factors were not enough to
secure an Indian victory when faced with higher numbers of English soldiers and their
allies and the support of England. But Malone is not a complete proponent of inevitability
in determining the outcome of the war. He acknowledges that human agency contributed
to the colonial victory. Like his contemporaries, and not like the seventeenth-century
writers, Malone at least considers and acknowledges the multiple factors that contributed
to the colonial victory. In outlining the importance of individual choices-especially the
choices of military leaders- Malone argues that the Native Americans were far superior in
forest combat until the English “made good use of their Indian allies and began to adopt
some Indian tactics.”79 Douglas Edward Leach wrote what was widely considered in the
mid-twentieth century, and still is by some today, the standard history of the war. In
Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War, Leach also pushes the
theme of inevitability. He argues that from the day when the first English settlers arrived
in New England and built permanent homes, “King Philip's War became virtually
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inevitable;” two incompatible ways of life confronted each other and only one could
prevail.80

War generates acts of narration, and this narration can take the form of oral
traditions or written traditions. Jill Lepore argues that war is, at least in part, a contest for
meaning, and the colonial victory ensured that their version of events, documented with
pen and paper, would eclipse the Native American version of events, expressed through
oral communication.81 Tribal networks that regulated oral transmission of knowledge
were challenged or snuffed by “Rhode Island legal strictures and dispersions that
disrupted the community’s ability to collectively speak or recount; and the loss of elders,
reservoirs and caretakers of cultural knowledge, would have been specially devastating to
these practices.”82 Local regulations strictly bound the surviving Native Americans
following King Philip's War to such an extent that “a concerted Narragansett history of
the war did not emerge in the postbellum period, akin to the detailed accountings of
Increase Mather (1676) or William Hubbard (1677).”83

Lepore holds the power of the written word in high esteem. She ponders how an
illiterate group of people could possibly prevail over those who possess the power to
transcribe: “If war is, at least in part, a contest for meaning, can it ever be a fair fight
when only one side has access to those perfect instruments of empire, pens, paper, and
printing presses?”84 Lepore gives ample credit to the power of the pen in securing
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military victories and so, like Drake, subscribes to the argument that acute factors are
largely influential in the determination of victors. Lepore, like other contemporary writers
of the war, acknowledges other influential factors in the colonial victory; she recognizes
the importance of England’s support for the colonists and she points to the use of Indian
allies as influential sources that contributed to the colonial victory.

Nathanial Philbrick outlines many factors that contributed to the colonial victory.
In Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War, Philbrick does not argue for the
inevitability of the conflict but allots credit to human agency and individual choices,
especially the choices of military leaders. He writes: “War came to New England because
two leaders-Philip and his English counterpart, Josiah Winslow- allowed it to happen.”85
Along with strong leaders, Philbrick argues the colonial victory was aided by the ability
of the colonists to outlast the Native Americans; though the colonists had suffered a
series of devastating defeats, they could rely on England to fortify their supplies of food,
muskets and ammunition. Philbrick identifies multiple explanations for the colonial
victory; it depended on the choices of military leaders as well as the promise of material
replenishment from England. He acknowledges the nuances of the war’s actors and the
events of the war. He writes: “I soon learned that the real-life Indians and English of the
seventeenth century were too smart, too generous, too greedy, too brave- in short, too
human- to behave so predictably.”86 Philbrick seemingly comes across a similar
explanation in his analysis of King Philip’s War.
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This thesis is unique because it combines historical, archaeological and
cultural landscape information to analyze the final and fatal attack on King Philip.
The scholarship that began at the end of the war and continued to the present was
critically evaluated. Archaeological site reconstruction was undertaken to
understand the physical and cultural landscape depicting Philip’s death site.
Modern statues and plaques that commemorate the war were investigated and
evaluated. All of this research synthesizes to create a more holistic and complete
understanding of the war and the specific event that essentially ended it.
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CHAPTER 3

CULTURAL COMPARISON OF WEAPONS AND WAR TACTICS
Weapons and War: English
Early explorers and settlers brought with them to New England iron weapons:
guns and knives; the majority of firearms carried by those who made landfall in 1621
were matchlock muskets. Bows existed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England,
but only men of upper classes hunted and such a practice was considered sport.87 In
England, “bows, still common under Queen Elizabeth, soon went out of style as hunting
weapons, and firearms did not immediately replace them.”88 The hunting skills of the
colonists paled in comparison to the native inhabitants of New England. It was common
practice to hunt with hounds and hawks in England, and let those animals do the killing.89
European weapons were brought to the New World to protect the colonists from wild
animals and aggressors; the weapons were also the means of supplying colonists with
food and commodities to send back to England.90 Because of their importance, the
colonists craved the most efficient types and their skill in using the firearms soon outdistanced the Europeans in the Old World.91
Simple in operation, a matchlock musket lowered a lighted match, held in a
device called a serpentine, into an open pan of priming powder. By pulling a trigger or
depressing a lever, the musketeer forced the serpentine to rotate against a restraining
spring, and the match dipped into the priming powder. The contact between the match
87
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and powder set off an explosive chain starting in the pan, traveling through a touch hole
to the propellant charge in the barrel. The projectile, usually a large lead ball weighing a
twelfth of a pound, was expelled from the barrel.92
The matchlock musket was an effective arm for the large formations characteristic
of European armies, but it was cumbersome and weighed up to twenty pounds. It was
also a short-range weapon, only accurate within fifty yards of the target, and it had to be
fired using a forked rest.93 Regardless, the weapon was appropriate for European infantry
actions in which ranks of musketeers fired concentrated volleys at close ranges.94 But
though the weapon was suited for the battlefields of Europe, it was inappropriate in New
England, where forest warfare dominated. In England, military commanders did not
worry about ambushes, night attacks, or enemies who took cover behind trees.95 The
matchlock wasn’t suited for the New England climate and landscape. Before firing the
gun, a matchlock required the musketeer to light his match (a cord treated with saltpeter
or gunpowder). Such a process was time consuming, especially since a match typically
burned on both ends and had to be adjusted frequently. Also, a match burned at a rate of
up to nine inches an hour, and so extra caches of cord had to be carried and kept dry on
the field.96 Matches also produced light and an odor. These side effects were dangerous in
forest warfare. A successful ambush required discreetness and convenience, and
matchlock muskets could not adequately provide that in New England.
Some professional soldiers and affluent colonists brought with them to the New
World more expensive and more advanced firearms. Captain Myles Standish, a military
92
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leader in Plymouth Colony, brought with him to New England a snaphaunce, which was
self-igniting and required no rest to steady it while firing.97 Realizing that matchlocks
were inefficient in forest warfare, military leaders like Myles Standish and John Endicott
convinced their colonial governments to purchase flintlocks as common arms.98 In 1646,
Plymouth Colony required each town to maintain in reserve, as public arms, two
flintlocks for every thirty men.99 The advantages of flintlocks were soon realized by the
colonists. Malone writes: “the transition to flintlocks was apparently complete in the
colony's militia bands years before the outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675. The
lessons learned in that devastating struggle prompted Plymouth officials to ban the
military use of matchlocks in 1677.”100 The colonists who fought in King Philip's War
were armed almost entirely with flintlocks, though their governments had not yet
formalized this transition from matchlocks to flintlocks in law. Massachusetts Bay
Colony finally enacted such a law in 1693; Connecticut Colony never did.101
Peterson divides the arms of the early settlers into three categories: defensive
armor, edged weapons, and projectile weapons. An armed man in the earlier part of 16201690 was equipped with at least one article in each category. A corselet, sword and
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musket were the most common.102 Armor at that time consisted of a corselet, a back and
breast plate of hammered iron or steel; protection for the thighs, groin, neck, and a helmet
for the head. The Massachusetts Bay Company purchased 60 suits of armor in 1628.103
Men from the Mayflower's first exploratory expedition wore corselets, which proved
beneficial. Peterson argues that the armor offset the danger of aboriginal arrows. The bow
was a more accurate and more efficient weapon compared to the average colonial musket,
but the arrows could not pierce armor so easily.104 Armor was heavy though, and proved
cumbersome since most confrontations played out in forests. Peterson argues: “In time
the settlers found that they could dodge the Indian arrows unless taken by surprise; and
then later the savages obtained guns, against which armor was of little use. Confronted
with this situation, the settlers decided in favor of freer movement.”105 By the time of
King Philip's War, the corselet was replaced by heavy leather or quilted coats.106 Armor
had its weaknesses, but it was deemed useful enough to keep in some form for King
Philip's War. Peterson writes of seventeenth-century soldiers in Plymouth Colony:
The soldiers wore body armor, which was proof against arrows; and
when attacked by small bodies of Indians, they could hold their
own. However, their offensive weapons were so inefficient that a
vigorous and persistent Indian attack could have wiped out the
colony. When the Pequots began such an offensive in 1637, the
Indians' chance of success had passed. The settler still wore body
armor, but the inefficient matchlock had been partially replaced by
a flint arm. The Indian had no armor to stop a bullet and
comparatively few serviceable firearms.107

It was customary for all soldiers of the early seventeenth century to carry swords
and knives. The usual procedure in combat: fire a volley, discard the musket, draw the
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sword and charge.108 There were common stores of arms for the early settlers but there
was no standard equipment; each man supplied his own weaponry, and so there was a
decent amount of variation.109 By the time of King Philip's War, knives and hatchets were
preferred by colonists for hand-to-hand combat over the sword.110 Peterson argues: “these
weapons were nearly universally possessed because of their utility in everyday life. There
was good precedent for their use in combat.”111 The colonists recognized the practicality
of such weapons in the New England landscape, and so adopted these tools that doubled
as killing machines. The pike was another edged European weapon brought to the New
World by the colonists. For seventeenth-century European armies, pikes played a
significant role. The musketeer was only beginning to take shape in Europe when
colonists broke off for New England; the settlers of Massachusetts Bay brought with
them 60 pikes and 20 half-pikes, nearly as many pikes as muskets.112 But pikes weren't
ideal in the New England country. Averaging 15 feet in length, the long shafts of pikes
made them hard to use in forest combat. In Europe, pikes were used on open battlefields,
and then primarily to hold ground gained by the soldiers; the pikemen drove the butts of
their weapons into the ground to present a fortress of pointed pikes. But, as Peterson
points out, Indian fighting didn’t involve pitched battles, cavalry or charges, and so pikes
were virtually useless.113 On October 13, 1675, a few months after the outbreak of King
Philip's War, the Massachusetts General Court declared all pikemen to furnish
108
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themselves with firearms.114 From 1630 to 1675, there was a change in firearm use and
preference among colonial armies.115 Listed in inventories and court records, matches are
referenced more than flints until the outbreak of the Pequot War in 1636. From then on,
tales of snap-shooting increased and records of ambushes indicate that flint arms
increased in popularity and use.116
The matchlock musket was in many ways inferior to the aboriginal bow; Peterson
argues that its chief merit lies in the panic it produced by the flash, smoke, smell and
noise of the explosion of the charge.117 A gun, too, could be loaded with several bullets
and wound a number of adversaries with one shot.118 Firelocks outdistanced matchlocks
in forest warfare, though. With firelock muskets, the powder in the priming pan was
ignited by striking a piece of flint against a piece of steel called a frizzen. The frizzen was
poised directly over the pan so that the sparks produced by the contact of the flint and
steel would drop into the pan. The pan had a cover so the powder could be kept dry.
Without the need for matches and the pan cover, a flint-functioning firearm could
discharge in dampness and even light rain, making it better suited for forest warfare in
New England than the matchlock musket.119 In fact:
With the coming of King Philip's War, the era of the
matchlock in America was definitely past. The
campaigns of that war, forays into the wilderness,
night attacks, ambushes, battles in the rain, and the
encounters between individuals which required snap114
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shooting indicate clearly that the snaphance was the
principal weapon.120

Weapons and War: Indians
Some archaeologists believe that humans first migrated to the Americas from
Asia at least 12,000 to 15,000 years ago.121 Overtime, the descendants of those people
moved south and east.122 It’s believed that the first settlers of Rhode Island were mobile
and “their implements, made of stone and bone, were designed for killing and cutting up
animals. They were lightweight tools such as spear points, knives, and scrapers.”123 The
most easily recognizable objects surviving from this period are fluted points, which are
tapered stone spear points.124 These stones were used by hunters; a point was attached to
a wooden spear and thrown or thrust at an animal.125 To craft the these tools, people
carved a groove on both sides of the stone point; that groove was known as the flute, and
it allowed the point to be fit into a wooden shaft.126 Fluted points were made by detaching
two long channel-shaped flakes with a tool of bone or antler; a difficult task, the
toolmaker likely made several failed attempts before making the perfect groove.127 One
such broken point provides the earliest evidence of people in Rhode Island; it was
recovered at the South Wind site near Wickford Cove in North Kingstown; the point was
dated to craftsmanship 10,000 years ago.128 Archaeologists argue that one hallmark of
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Late Woodland and Late Prehistoric cultures was the use of the bow and arrow.129 This
argument is reflected in the archaeological record as “smaller, often triangular projectile
points considered diagnostic of the Late Woodland throughout the Eastern
Woodlands.”130 The technological change from spears with large points to bows and
arrows with smaller projectile points could be associated with more efficient and intense
deer hunting, but it may also be associated with increases in inter-group conflict and
warfare.131 The authors of Seeking Our Past: An Introduction to North American
Archaeology assert that archaeological evidence for intergroup conflict among people in
the Eastern Woodlands, particularly in the Late Prehistoric period, is reflected both in
injuries found in burial populations and in the presence of palisaded villages at the
time.132
The aboriginal bow as a tool for hunting and inter-tribal warfare extended to its
use in warfare with the European colonists for most of the seventeenth century, but the
aboriginal arsenal was eventually supplemented with guns.133 The efficiency of a weapon
is determined by the strength and accuracy of the weapon itself but also by the skill of the
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person who uses the weapon.134 The native inhabitants of New England were skilled
hunters and efficient at using their bows, which were sturdy and powerful weapons.
According to Leveillee, Waller Jr. and Ingram: “The late pre-contact environment
in southern Rhode Island supported a rich and diverse floral and faunal resource base
available for human exploitation.”135 Rhode Island’s salt ponds especially “were dynamic
settings in which diverse and abundant plant and animal communities thrives, with
eelgrass as a keystone species.”136 In the excavation of RI 100, a large site distributed
over a 72-acre parcel in Narragansett, Rhode Island, archaeologists with The Public
Archaeology Laboratory, Inc., recovered oyster shell, bone fragments, quart, quartzite,
argillite debitage, fire-cracked rock, and argillite tool, Indian pottery sherds and several
Late Woodland projectile points.137 Shellfish were abundant in southern Rhode Island in
the late pre-contact period, as well as finfish and migratory and resident bird and
waterfowl species.138 The abundance of fish in the coastal waters was the original reason
that Breton, Portuguese, and Bristol fishermen had started to fish in the area in the
fifteenth century.139 After living in New England for four years, civilian William Wood
wrote of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and published his observations in 1634's New
England's Prospect. He wrote of New England in 1634: “there is no country known that
yields more variety of fish winter and summer.”140 Birds like turkey were abundant in the
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region and hunted for their meat.141 Wood wrote: “some (native inhabitants) killed ten or
a dozen in half a day. If they can be found towards an evening and watched where they
perch, if one come about ten or eleven of the clock, he may shoot...they will sit unless
they be slenderly wounded.”142
The interior or near-interior freshwater lakes, rivers, streams and wetlands also
supported various mammal species like grey squirrels, beavers, river otters, raccoons, red
and grey foxes, rabbits and white-tailed deer.143 The abundance of such animals coupled
with the need for protein, skins and furs necessitated the need for weapons that allowed
for the killing and processing of these animals. In 1605, James Rosier of England wrote
of a voyage to the Maine coast and described the hunt for a whale. Aboriginal bows and
arrows were used to kill the animal:
He is 12 fathoms long; and that they go in company of their King with a multitude of
their boats, and strike him with a bone made in fashion of a harping iron fastened to a
rope, when they make great and strong of the barke of trees, which they veare out
after him; then all their boats come about him, and as he riseth above water, with their
arrowes they shoot him to death...144

Writing in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Thomas Morton described the deer
as “the most usefull and most beneficiall beast” of the region.145 Deer were numerous
enough to supply meat year-round for the native inhabitants of New England.146 Men
used a variety of techniques to hunt: “game might be stalked with bow and arrow by a
lone hunter or by groups of two or three hundred men working together.”147 Giovanni da
Verrazano, a Florentine sailor, wrote in 1524 that species such as stags, deer and lynxes
141
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were captured by the native inhabitants with snares and bows: “the latter being their chief
implement.”148 Prey could be tricked, and “run between specially planted hedges more
than a mile in length until it was finally driven into the weapons of waiting hunters.”149
But Cronon warns that simple measures of caloric content tend to undervalue the
importance of the fall and winter hunt to an agricultural village's subsistence cycle.150
Animals were not only sources of food, their skins and furs were also used to clothe and
warm the native inhabitants of southern New England. The abundance of animals and the
need for protein and clothing necessitated the need for hunting weapons, and hardwood
trees were plentiful in the region and sufficient to craft weapons to kill these animals.151
Southern New England forests (forests in Connecticut, Rhode Island and the
eastern fourth of Massachusetts) were dense with a variety of central hardwoods: black,
red and white oaks; chestnut, the hickories, and some hemlock and scattered white
pine.152 According to Leveillee et al.:
…pollen cores from the Pettaquamscutt River in Narragansett indicate the dominant forest circa
(ca.) 2000 years B.P. included mixed red oak and white pine with some hickory, birch, túpelo,
and beech. Pollen data from North Kingstown indicate that around 1400 B.P. oak remained the
dominant forest species followed by alder, mixed with a minimal amount of pine and birch.153

Oak and hickory were probably the most common woods used for bows, but many other
species of tree supplied sufficient material to craft strong bows.154 Arrows were made of
felsite, quartz or quartzite found in the region.155 Whether hunting big game or used in
combat, the arrowhead was designed “to penetrate deeply, cut severely, and remain
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lodged in the victim. An arrow has little shocking power on impact, but with a sharp head
it becomes a deadly, hemorrhage-producing projectile.”156 Writing in 1605, James Rosier
of England wrote of a voyage to the Maine coast, and described the bows of a group of
native inhabitants he encountered:
Their bow is made of Wich Hazell, and some of Beech in fashion
much like our bowes, but they want nocks, onely a string of leather
put through a hole at one end, and made fast with a knot at the
other. Their arrowes are made of the same wood, some of Ash, big
and long, with three feathers tied on, and nocked very artificiallie:
headed with the long shanke bone of a Deere, made very sharpe
with two fangs in manner of a harping iron. They have likewise
Darts, headed with like bone, one of which I darted among the
rockes, and it brake not. These were use very cunningly, to kill fish,
fowle and beasts.157

The aboriginal bows were described by Europeans as moderately strong compared
to English bows.158 James Rosier drew an aboriginal witch hazel bow during his voyage
along the Maine coast in 1605 and wrote that the bow had the strength to carry the arrow
five or six score.159 Though its capacity to travel a certain distance was limited, the hunter
or warrior also determined the bow's success at dealing a devastating blow onto a
target.160 Thomas Lechford observed the accuracy of native inhabitants with their bows
and arrows at short ranges, remarking they were “very good at a short mark.”161
The devastation wrought by a bow depends, in part, on the distance between the
bow holder and the target.162 Malone notes the weaknesses of bows: he argues that if
someone shoots an arrow in a forest, and he is a considerable distance from his target, he
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risks hitting branches and missing his shot.163 In a field fight, at a considerable distance
from the target, the archer needs to shoot high in the air in order for the arrow to descend
on the target. But that slow, overarching flight gives the target time to dodge the arrow.164
Mason argues that distance, wind, varying elasticity of the bow, varying weight of the
arrow, shape of the arrow and penetrability of the game determine the success of the
weapon.165 Mason asserts that “each one of these variables is rendered as constant as
possible by the hunter, in skulking, getting to windward, using wood of the greatest
strength for bows, and making one's own arrows.”166 Early colonists testified to the
Native Americans' skilled mitigation of these potential hindrances. William Wood wrote:
“when they get sight of a deer, moose, or bear, they study how to get the wind of him,
and approaching within shot, stab their mark quite through, if the bones hinder not.”167
When the aboriginal inhabitants of New England closed with their enemies in
combat, they relied on clubs and axes; “a fight that began with exchanges of arrows often
ended with a rush by axe- or club-swinging warriors.”168 Detailing events of the Pequot
War in 1637, John Mason wrote of a band of Pequots that charged the Mohegans, allies
of the English. As the enemy encroached, the Mohegans did not move “until the other
came within thirty or forty Paces of them; then they run and met them,” and struck blows
with hatchets and knives.169 The native inhabitants of southern New England used
smooth, grooveless heads of various sizes for their war axes.170 Warriors carried
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“tomahawks, made of wood like a pole axe, with a sharpened stone fastened therein.”171
Early colonists often used the word “tomahawk” to refer to ball-headed wooden clubs,
stone hammers, stone axes, or other striking instruments.172 The tomahawk, a type of
stone axe, was made by forcing the tapered end of a smooth stone head through a hole in
a solid wood handle; the tool was strong enough to withstand the rigors of combat and
could be used for woodcutting as well.173
Malone argues that warfare is often limited in its scope and ferocity “by the
deliberate restraint of combatants and by the capabilities of their technology.”174 He
asserts that “Indians did undertake prolonged sieges of fortified positions on occasion and
would sometimes meet in open fields for battles or skirmishes involving large numbers of
warriors. In all these forms of warfare, relatively few participants were ever killed.”175
Roger Williams noted of Indian wars: “their Warres are farre lesse bloudy, and devouring
then the cruell Warres of Europe; and seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field.”176 Writing
in 1943, Turney-High offers his interpretation of Native American warfare: to achieve the
motive, the enemy must be obliterated entirely, and “nonliterate warriors” failed to grasp
this.177 For most Native American tribes, “the objective was often gained by vindicating
honor, or slapping someone in the face with a quirt rather than killing him.”178 Like
Malone and Williams, Turney-High subscribes to the argument that Native American
warfare was limited; he interprets Native American warfare as small-scale relative to
171

Daniel Gookin, Historical Collections of the Indians in New England (1792), in Special Collections
Publications (University of Rhode Island), http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/sc_pubs/13, 152.
172
Malone, 19.
173
Ibid., 18.
174
Ibid., 1.
175
Malone, 7.
176
Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America (London: Gregory Dexter, 1643), 188.
177
Harry Holbert Turney-High, Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1949), 103.
178
Ibid., 104.

37

European warfare. Writing in 1988, Hirsch argues in “The Collision of Military Cultures
in Seventeenth-Century New England” that “if waged in the name of retaliation, an
Indian war ostensibly ceased when the aggrieved had inflicted retribution.”179
Ambushes and raids on villages were much more frequent than actual battles.180
Turney-High argues that “sociological patterns demanded that the raid and the
ambuscade remain the chief types of operations” in Native American warfare; other
historians reasoned that personal vendettas or other issues between tribes didn't
necessitate organized armies but ambushes or raids with objectives narrow in scope and
minimum bloodshed.181 Malone posits that fire was not a favored weapon used by the
Native Americans in their wars, which indicates a reluctance to utterly destroy.182 He
argued that the limited scope of aboriginal warfare-to quell personal vendettas or the likerendered fire too horrible and deadly to use.183
English observers thought this restriction in the numbers of deaths and level of
destruction wrought in times of conflict made violent native encounters look like games.
William Wood was unimpressed with Native American wars, remarking that “they do not
now practice anything in martial feats worth observation.”184 The most significant war
activity the Indians partook in was the building of “forts to fly into” in the case of an
enemy ambush.185 When they engaged in war Wood thought the Native Americans to be
unorganized, with no marching, ranks, or files. He remarked: the Native Americans “let
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fly their winged shaftments without either fear or wit. Their artillery being spent, he that
hath no arms to fight, finds legs to run away.”186 The colonial observances of aboriginal
warfare and analyses of that warfare by historians in the twentieth century reveal a
pattern of regarding Indian warfare as small-scale relative to English warfare. Because
Indian warfare is evaluated against the backdrop of English warfare, it’s instantly seen as
less catastrophic and intense. Fights and deaths among the Indians were surely
devastating to those involved, no matter the body count.
The reasons for fighting varied; New England Indians may have fought to gain
prestige and power, to demonstrate courage and combat skills, to resist offensive actions,
dominate weaker neighbors, to seize tribute, gain hunting territory and fishing rights, to
control trade or to avenge real or imagined wrongdoings.187 James Axtell argues that
antagonisms and irritations often feed the fires of war and “the ardent spirits of the
greedy, the proud, and the young can never be thoroughly dampened.”188 Williams noted
that mockery between powerful tribal figures “is a great kindling of Warres amongst
them.”189 Daniel Gookin, a Puritan missionary and magistrate of the Massachusetts
Colony, wrote in 1674 that the Indians were “very revengeful, and will not be unmindful
to take vengeance upon such as have injured them or their kindred.”190 Malone notes that
a disastrous plague hit the coast of New England in 1616 and decimated the aboriginal
populations; the disruption of the balance of power, since some tribes were ravaged by
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the sickness while others avoided it, may have contributed to increased inter-tribal
aggression.191
Trade and Guns
The Mayflower made landfall at Plymouth, Massachusetts in 1621, but the
introduction of European trade items to the Indians in New England had begun before
permanent settlement by Europeans.192 Verrazano was commissioned by Francis I in
1523 to cross the Atlantic in search of a sea route to Catbay. Before entering Newport
Harbor, Verrazano wrote of twenty small boats approaching his ship, the Native
Americans “came near enough for us to toss to them some little bells and glasses.”193 He
noted that the Native Americans prized the colonial bells, azure crystals and toys; “when
we showed them our arms, they expressed no admiration, and only asked how they were
made.”194 Native Americans in Cape Cod took knives, fish hooks, and sharpened steel
from Verrazano and his crew.195 George Waymouth embarked on a voyage to the Maine
coast in 1605, commissioned to select a location for a settlement; James Rosier
accompanied Waymouth and wrote an account of the voyage. Knives, glasses, combs and
“other trifles” were traded with the Native Americans.196
The adoption of European guns by the Native Americans had a dramatic effect on
their military system.197 Despite the superior rate of fire of aboriginal bows, Native
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Americans quickly recognized the advantages of muskets both on the hunt and in war.198
Bullets flew faster than arrows and took a more direct route to the target. Also, the heavy
lead projectiles were less likely to deflect off overhanging branches; they were also
nearly impossible to dodge and more damaging upon impact.199 “In sharp contrast to the
majority of English colonists, New England Indians chose flintlocks over matchlocks
almost immediately,” according to Malone; the aboriginal inhabitants of New England
recognized, as early as 1607, the weaknesses in the ignition system of the matchlock
musket.200 Writing in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Gookin observed that as
a result of trade with the English, Dutch and French, the native inhabitants of New
England “generally disuse their former weapons, and instead thereof have guns, pistols,
swords, rapier blades, fastened unto a staff of the length of a half pike, hatchets and
axes.”201 More Native Americans in southern New England began to use firearms in the
1620s. By the beginning of King Philip's War in 1675, most Indian hunters and fighters
had flintlock muskets or carbines.202 The colonial weapons enabled the Native Americans
to hunt more efficiently and gather ample furs, which were coveted by the colonists. With
the arrival of the colonists and demand for trade items, Native American tribes had more
incentives to compete with one another; coupled with flintlocks, opportunities for
aggression and domination grew among the Native Americans of New England.203
Thomas Morton wrote of Plymouth Colony governor William Bradford's
observations of Native Americans and European guns:
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Hearing what gain the French and fishermen made by trading of pieces, powder and
shot to the Indians, he, as the head of this consortship, began the practice of the
same in these parts. And first he taught them to use them, to charge and discharge,
and what proportion of powder to give the piece, according to the size and bigness
of the same; and what shot to use for fowl and what for deer. And having thus
instructed them, he employed some of them to hunt and fowl for him, so as they
became far more active in that employment than any of the English, by reason of
their swiftness of foot and nimbleness of body; being also quick sighted, and by
continual exercise well knowing the haunts of all sorts of game. So as when they
saw the execution that a piece would do, and the benefit that might come by the
same, they became mad, as it were, after them, and would not (stick) to give any
price they could attain to for them; accounting their bows and arrows but bawbles in
comparison of them.204

Morton evidences the Native American preference for firearms over aboriginal bows and
also their skill in using guns.
Tactics
Tactics in hunting and warfare evolve to accommodate the accuracy of the
weapons and the objective of the hunter or warrior; they are also affected by the physical
environment and the cultural tendencies of the hunters or warriors. Malone argues that
“most colonists in the first three quarters of the seventeenth century thought of warfare in
terms of formal battles and single-minded dedication to the destruction of the enemy.”205
In violent encounters, English colonists wanted the Native Americans to fight in the
open; they wanted more military discipline from the Native American enemy. John
Mason, chief commander of the Connecticut forces during the Pequot War (1636-1637)
was disappointed with the result of a battle between his Mohegan allies and a band of
Pequots: one hundred Mohegans descended on sixty Pequots, and struck them with
arrows and cut them with hatchets and knives in a way that appeared disorganized and
“feeble” to Mason, who remarked “it did hardly deserve the Name of Fighting.”206 In the
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aftermath of the Mistick Fight, it is evident by this sentence: “There was at the Foot of
the Hill a small Brook, where we rested and refreshed ourselves, having by that time
taught them a little more Manners than to disturb us,” that Mason didn't take the enemy
seriously.207
Malone argues that, although the Native American warriors retained more
individual freedom in acts of war than did soldiers in the disciplined ranks of a European
army, they still employed tactical plans.208 (Malone 107) In fact, “their ambushes and
raids required a high level of tactical skill and coordination. Just to move a body of men
secretly through the forest was a serious military problem,” and fighting in the forest
presented challenges only good tactical control could overcome. “Most English observers
failed to see the tactical sophistication that often shaped aboriginal military actions. Men
who fought apart from their comrades, who hid behind trees and fired at will, seemed by
European standards to have no real military skill or tactical order.”209 Skulking behind
trees was to English observers dishonorable but to Indian soldiers a cunning and effective
strategy. Native Americans in New England made the terrain and vegetation their
allies.210 Williams observed that when the Narragansetts fought in the woods “every Tree
is a Bucklar.”211
Mobility was critical in Native American warfare, and rapid travel can be
considered an offensive action that, like fire, is meant to shock the enemy.212 TurneyHigh argues “fire, mobility, and shock imply aggression, the great principle of the

207

Ibid., 11.
Malone, 107.
209
Ibid., 21.
210
Ibid.
211
Williams, 188.
212
Malone, 11; Turney-High, 99.
208

43

offensive.”213 Offensive actions were generally well observed in the New World, and the
Native Americans preferred “close-up shock work,” enlisting the use of clubs and axes to
administer crushing blows.214 Offensive actions for the native inhabitants of New
England usually took the form of ambushes. Armor was uncommon for Native
Americans in warfare, likely due to the nature of their wars; it was heavy and hindered
mobility in the execution of an ambush. Armor was largely shunned by Native Americans
because of the weight and impracticality of such a device in ambushes and raids, which
required swiftness.
To not only stay mobile but to move stealthily and quickly required technological
aids for the New England environment. Moccasins, manufactured from deer or moose,
were light-weight, comfortable and quiet in the forest. When winter snows cloaked the
region, Native Americans strapped snowshoes to their feet and moved freely over deep
drifts to reach game or enemies.215 The ambush was not a simple military operation;
factors other than footwear, which proved a burden onto itself, had to be weighed before
executing the military feat. Malone writes:
When the Indians set an ambush, they tried to pick a location where they
could achieve complete surprise and hold their opponents long enough to
inflict casualties or take prisoners. The choice of terrain was very important,
for natural features like cliffs, rivers, or lakes could block a route of escape
and make it easier to pin the victims in a vulnerable position. If there were
no obstacles on at least one side of the location, the Indians would usually
try to close a circle around the enemy at the moment of attack. The ambush
position also had to offer good concealment for the attacking force; catching
your opponents unaware was the key to success.216
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Ambushes and raids were timed to catch opponents off guard and cause confusion;
“attacks in darkness, at first light, and during storms or conditions of heavy fog gave the
raiders a better chance of success.”217
In May 1637, Captain John Mason commanded ninety men enlisted by the
Connecticut Colony to march against the Pequots. In his account of the war, written years
later, Mason explains why a certain route to reach the enemy was chosen: “Their
Numbers far exceeded ours; having sixteen Guns with Powder and Shot, as we were
informed by the two Captives.”218 Out-gunned, the colonial army adopted a Native
American way of war and opted for an ambush. Mason wrote: “By Narragansett we
should come upon their Backs and possibly might surprise them unaware...which proved
very successful.”219 When they believed they drew near, Mason and his council
convened; “And being informed by the Indians (allies) that the Enemy had two Forts
almost impregnable; but we were not at all Discouraged, but rather Animated, in so much
that we were resolved to Assault both their Forts at once.”220 Mason implies that he and
his men were giddy with the thought of more destruction and bloodshed. A preference for
total warfare, the prospect of burning two forts rather than one excited Mason. The place
of the fort being Mistick, the fight came to be known as the Mistick Fight, and
approximately 500 Native American men, women and children were slaughtered by the
colonial army. With the ambush, “the Mischief they intended to us, came upon their own
Pate: They were taken in their own Snare.”221 With such language as “taken in their own
Snare,” Mason implies the tactic used, an ambush, which secured the colonial victory,
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was originally a Native American offensive method. Mason smugly suggests that he
learned and he learned well; he gave the enemy a deadly dose of their own medicine.
Mason and his men fought like Indians, and they won.
Mason described one ambush during the Pequot War: “...some of them lay in
Ambush behind Rocks and Trees, often shooting at us, yet through Mercy touched not
one of us.”222 As a protective and counteractive measure, Mason's army, as they
approached any swamp or thicket, shot into the passage to reveal any potential skulkers.
He wrote that “some of them fell with our Shot; and probably more might, but for want of
Munition.”223 Ammunition was limited, but even so colonists used it to clear passages,
not aiming for specific targets but simply firing and hoping for the best. Such a tactic
demonstrates the colonial recognition of the lethal potential of forest concealment and the
great potential for an enemy ambush. The colonists must have felt confident in firing
their limited ammunition that it would likely not be wasted; there were skulkers where
they shot.
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Chapter 4
ARCHAEOLOGY
Orser and Fagan define modern archaeology as “the systematic study of humanity
in the past.”224 Archaeologists and historians often divide the span of human existence
into prehistoric (before written documents and archives) and historic (that portion of
human history that begins with written records) times.225 Historical archaeology is the
archaeological study of people documented in recent history, and so is the type of
archaeology used when dealing with Rhode Island sites dated to the years of European
colonization.226 Orser and Fagan argue that archaeology “is as much a part of the study of
history as the historic building, crabbed document, or government archive.”227 Neusius
and Gross assert that the most important point underscored by the archaeology of the
Protohistoric period “is that the socio-cultural systems into which Europeans were
beginning to interject themselves were dynamic systems in their own right.”228 It’s
important to regard the Indian people and their belongings that were recovered via
archaeological excavations not as passive recipients to European colonizers but complex
people enmeshed in “economic, social, and political interactions.”229
Archaeological excavations are typically sensitive undertakings, especially when
they involve human remains. In a 2003 article, Paul Robinson and John Brown wrote:
“on the issue of who controls the practice of archaeology in Rhode Island, the SHPO
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[State Historic Preservation Office aka The Rhode Island Historical Preservation and
Heritage Commission] and the NITHPO [Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic
Preservation Office] sharply disagree with each other.”230 Archaeologists and Native
American tribes collaborated successfully with the excavation in the 1970s of RI 1000,
but disagreed on some details that were published in the RIHPHC book Native American
Archaeology.231 In August 2017, the Pokanoket Tribe occupied Brown University
property in Bristol; the tribe established an encampment on a part of the 375-acre
property near the Heffenreffer Museum collections center. During a peaceful
demonstration in Providence on September of that year, the tribe explained to a
Providence Journal reporter the property was “sacred ground” (believed to be a gathering
place of Philip and his followers) and claimed a right to the land along with other Native
American groups, including the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), the
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, the Assonet Band of the Wampanoag Nation, the Herring
Pond Wampanoag Tribe, the Pocasset Wampanoag Tribe and the Narragansett Indian
Tribe.232 Brown and the Pokanoket Tribe eventually reached an agreement, which they
officiated on September 21, 2017. The agreement outlined a plan for Brown to transfer a
portion of its Bristol property into a preservation trust to ensure the conservation of the
land and sustainable access by Native American tribes in the region.233 The Pokanoket
ended their encampment on September 25, 2017. The ramifications of King Philip’s War
230
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reverberate today in land disputes and disagreement over archaeological sites and
materials. It’s important to appreciate the complex human issues at stake behind scientific
evaluations.
This chapter demonstrates archaeology’s strength in yielding physical evidence
for Indian adoption of colonial firearms. The focus will be on a Wampanoag burial
ground dated to the seventeenth century in Warren, Rhode Island. The next section will
focus on the archaeology of the site where King Philip was allegedly killed by a soldier
under the direction of Benjamin Church.
Physical Setting
Bristol, Rhode Island is twenty-one square miles in area and located in Bristol
County on the eastern shore of Narragansett Bay. Bristol is sixteen miles southeast of
Providence and seventeen miles north of Newport. It is bordered on the north by the town
of Warren.234 Most of Bristol's boundary is water. Narragansett Bay forms the western
boundary while Mount Hope Bay and the Kickemuit River form the eastern boundary.
Bristol occupies two promontories and is shaped roughly like a lobster claw;
Poppasquash Neck extends like the smaller digit from the western side of Bristol Neck.
Bristol Harbor is set between the two peninsulas.235
Bristol's topography is the result of the retreat of the last great glacier, which
reached as far south as Block Island about eighteen thousand years ago. As the glacier
melted, the sea level rose and water flooded inland, creating the irregular and indented
coastline of Narragansett Bay. In general, Bristol's land is low-lying and vulnerable to
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floods, but on the southeast shore of Bristol Neck, Mount Hope rises 221 feet to form the
high point on Mount Hope Bay. Mount Hope has a large outcrop of granite gneiss on its
west escarpment and a white quartz outcrop on the east, known as King Philip's Chair.236
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Map of Warren, Rhode Island, showing location of Burr’s Hill.237
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Archaeology of Burr’s Hill
Archaeological evidence provides physical evidence that Native Americans
adopted European weapons. Burr's Hill, a natural gravel bank overlooking the eastern
shore of the Warren River in Warren, Rhode Island, is the site of a Wampanoag burial
ground. Before 1873, when the boundary between the towns of Warren and Bristol was
moved, Burr's Hill had been situated at the northern end of Bristol.238 Bristol occupies
Mount Hope Neck, where Philip allegedly made his headquarters.239
During the spring and summer of 1913, 42 burials along with their associated
grave goods were unearthed at Burr's Hill.240 Compared with other Northeastern contact
period burial grounds, the Burr's Hill site was comparatively rich in terms of the quantity
of material remains recovered.241 Most of the surviving objects from the Burr's Hill site
can be reliably dated to the third quarter of the seventeenth century, which would place it
in the appropriate time frame for this study.242
Adoption of European material culture including weaponry is reflected in the
material from Burr's Hill.243 In fact, “the overwhelming majority of the objects found in
the graves at Burr's Hill are either European imports or were made with European tools or
materials.”244 Though it is important to remember that “the proportion of European to
aboriginal objects found in the graves at Burr's Hill may not reflect their relative
proportions in daily use,” the weapons interred with the dead still show a mesh of
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cultures and handling of European materials by the Native Americans, specifically the
Wampanoags.245 The archaeological evidence coupled with historic evidence helps us
understand the use of European weapons by Native Americans during King Philip's War.

Burr's Hill, February 2018. Photo: Laura Damon.

Burr's Hill itself was purchased by the town of Warren in 1921 and made into a
public park.246 According to local tradition, Warren was the site of Sowams, the principal
village of the Wampanoag sachem Ousamequin, known to the Pilgrims as Massasoit.247
The human remains recovered from Burr's Hill were likely Wampanoags based on the
location of the burial ground and the date of the artifacts associated with the remains. The
human remains at Burr's Hill were disinterred repeatedly throughout the latter part of the
nineteenth century and early years of the 20 century through various construction
th

projects. The construction of the Providence, Warren, and Bristol Railroad, which opened
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in 1851, caused some disturbance to the site.248 In the spring of 1913, gravel-mining
operations again intruded into the burial ground. Charles Read Carr, a local resident and
librarian at the George Hail Free Library in Warren, undertook the first and only
systematic archaeological excavations ever conducted at the site.249 Carr wanted to
assemble materials for an ethnological exhibit at the library, but he kept records of the
excavation process.250 He recruited friends and other laymen to dig. Human remains were
discovered along with wampum and stone tools, and Carr surmised the site was a
Wampanoag burial ground.251 Carr attempted to preserve a piece of Indian history; he
excavated so artifacts could be recovered before full damage was done. But Carr wasn’t
entirely sensitive or careful in his work.252 According to the RIHPHC publication Native
American Archaeology in Rhode Island “the matter-of-fact, casual attitude toward both
the unintentional (mining) and intentional (Carr’s attempts at archaeology) removal of
burials contrasts with the preference of many people today to leave graves
undisturbed.”253
On August 15, 1913, Carr procured an agreement from the New York, New
Haven, and Hartford Railroad, which owned the Burr's Hill tract. The agreement
stipulated that any artifacts found there would become the property of the George Hail
Free Library.254 At the time of publication, Gibson wrote that the Burr's Hill collection
was divided principally between the George Hail Free Library in Warren, the
Haffenreffer Museum of Anthropology in Bristol, and the Museum of the American
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Indian Heye Foundation in New York. Some items were also scattered among museums
and private collections.255 In May 2017, the Wampanoag Tribe reclaimed the Burr's Hill
artifacts from the Heffenreffer Museum and George Hail Free Library and reinterred
them at Burr's Hill, according to a personal conversation with Patricia Redfearn, director
of the George Hail Free Library.
For many of the 42 burials unearthed at Burr's Hill in the spring and summer of
1913, the bones had almost entirely disintegrated, but in some they were preserved well
enough that grave placement attributes could be discerned.256 Most of the individuals had
been buried in the typical manner of the Native Americans of southern New England of
the Late Woodland and Early Historic periods: with the body flexed and knees drawn to
the chest.257 Many individuals had been wrapped in matting, blankets or bark boards.258 A
number of graves contained traces of powdered red ocher pigment, an important element
of mortuary ceremonialism over much of eastern North America from Late Archaic times
to the historic period.259
At least two individuals at Burr's Hill were buried in the European style, with legs
extended. There were no extended burials at the comparable Native American West Ferry
site in Jamestown, Rhode Island (c. 1610-1660). Nor were there extended burials at RI
1000, the site of a Narragansett cemetery in North Kingstown (c. 1650-1670s).260 But at
the slightly later (c. 1660-1730) Pantiago site in East Hampton, Long Island, nearly half
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of the recorded burials (17 of 38) were extended.261 This shift in body orientation for the
dead reflects an adoption of European customs and Christian religion. Native Americans
still incorporated elements of their aboriginal culture, though. At Burr’s Hill, those who
were buried with extended legs faced the same direction as the flexed dead, generally,
with heads in a southerly direction. Gibson argues: “rather than signaling the rejection of
native burial customs, the extended body posture seems to have been incorporated into
the traditional mortuary complex, in much the same manner that European trade wares
were.”262 The high number of multiple interments- at least 10 out of 42 at Burr's Hillcompared to one each at the West Ferry and Pantiago sites (sites of comparable size) may
be attributable to a smallpox epidemic, especially coupled with the evidence of postules
recorded on one preserved skull.263
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Firearm and firearm-related artifact inventory of Burr’s Hill.264
264

Gibson, 135.

57

Firearm and firearm-related inventory of Burr’s Hill.265
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In his analysis of Burr’s Hill firearms, Jean-Francois Blanchette dates the Burr's
Hill flintlock to the mid-seventeenth century; the blade gunflints (of which there are eight
in the Burr's Hill collection) were first produced in the mid-seventeenth century.266 Not
all burial offerings are dated to this period, however. The earliest European trade objects
in the Burr's Hill collection date to the early seventeenth century, or possibly the late
sixteenth century. Blanchette dates the matchlock to the end of the sixteenth century or
beginning of the seventeenth.267 Since the great bulk of the collection dates from the midcentury or later, it is perhaps more plausible to suppose that these earlier objects are items
which had been in use some time before being interred or heirlooms passed down from a
previous generation.268 Nonetheless, Gibson posits:
The manufacturing dates of the surviving objects from Burr's
Hill suggest that most of the burials were made during King
Philip's sachemship, probably during the quarter century or less
preceding King Philip's War (1675/6) and possibly during the
war. The location of the cemetery south of the original Warren
boundary may well be more than a coincidence, for while
Warren was settled by Englishmen as early as 1667, Bristol
was reserved for the Wampanoag until 1680.269

The only purely aboriginal materials from the graves excavated in 1913 were four stone
pestles, one clay pot, one wooden spoon fragment, a bone implement, one arrowhead and
numerous matting fragments.270 Although the majority of the objects found in the graves
at Burr's Hill were either European imports or made with European tools or materials, the
266
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tasks they were put to and their forms more closely conformed to Wampanoag than to
European cultural patterns.271 In some cases, imported goods simply replaced
functionally similar items in the aboriginal material culture. For example, steel hoes, axes
and knives substituted for shell, wood, bone or stone tools.272
Gibson argues the abundance of materials at Burr's Hill is its most striking
feature.273 The Burr's Hill site is slightly smaller than the West Ferry site in terms of total
number of interments, and it's comparable to the Pantiago site on Long Island, but Burr's
Hill exceeded both in sheer quantity of grave goods.274 The material collection is now
fragmented (some materials were reinterred and some are in personal collections) so it is
difficult to compare absolute numbers of artifacts from the three sites, but Gibson posits
Burr's Hill yielded nearly three times as many objects as West Ferry and more than four
times as many as Pantiago.275
Carr recorded that 36 of the 42 interments contained some burial offerings.276
Why was the Burr's Hill site comparatively rich? It may be due to the strategic position
occupied by this group of Wampanoag; it was a location within the vicinity of Philip's
headquarters at Mount Hope. Gibson posits: “living in or near the principal village of the
chief sachem, the Wampanoag group which utilized the Burr's Hill cemetery undoubtedly
would have had greater access to European trade wares than would peripherally situated
groups.”277 Greater accessibility may bias the study of this particular cemetery; a
cemetery will naturally yield more grave goods if those goods were more plentiful for the
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people in life. There the significance is attached not only to the quantity of material
remains but also to the very act of interring goods with the dead. Seventeenth century
chroniclers reported that grave goods were placed in the graves of the aboriginal people
of New England to meet the needs of the dead in the afterlife.278
Jean-Francois Blanchette notes that the Wampanoag were selective in their
adoption of European guns; they favored the flintlock over the matchlock, and “this
selectivity in the choice of firearms should be reflected in the archaeological record.”279
Thus, matchlocks and wheellocks should be absent from aboriginal sites and flintlocks
should be found in sites dated after 1630 or 1640.280 Particularly noteworthy, though, is
that a matchlock plate with serpentine was recovered from the Burr's Hill site. Blanchette
argues that this does not necessarily contradict the generalization that matchlocks were
not widely used by the native inhabitants of North America, “for it must be understood
that artifacts found in burial sites are offerings to the dead and do not necessarily
represent objects actually used by living Indians.”281 In fact, burial sites often contain
broken tools or utensils, special artifacts to be used strictly by the deceased and/or surplus
materials.282 The matchlock from Burr's Hill may have been a broken and useless object
that was deemed suitable for burial; the serpentine was set facing away from the plate and
was therefore useless.283

The European firearms and related artifacts recovered from Burr's Hill included:
one matchlock, one possible doglock plate, one lockplate from an unknown firing
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mechanism, one pistol barrel, one gun barrel, parts of another gun barrel, eight gunflints,
two lead shot molds and numerous lead shot.284 To ignite a flintlock, gunflints were
necessary. Held between the jaws of the cock, the pulling of the trigger projected the flint
against a steel plate known as the battery; the impact of the flint against the steel was so
great that it caused particles from the steel plate to become detached, ignite, and fall into
the pan which contained the powder.285 There are bifacial gunflints and spall gunflints;
bifacial gunflints achieve their form thanks to a percussion chipping manufacture.286
Spall gunflint was made from a flake that detached from a pebble and was rounded off by
small re-touches on the thickest sides.287 When ready-made gunflints couldn't be
obtained, Native Americans made their own. Bifacial gunflints were not recovered from
the Burr's Hill site.288 In seventeenth century North American sites, the majority of
gunflints recovered are usually of the spall type.289 The Burr's Hill collection contains
one spall gunflint held in the jaws of a cock.290 Blanchette notes that “their rarity in the
Burr's Hill collection is difficult to explain. It is possible that the Wampanoag needed
gunflints so badly during that period that they could not afford to bury them with their
dead.”291 Whether the objects were broken and useless in life or the materials were too
precious to bury due to their limited quantities, the burial of European goods with Native
American people demonstrates an interweaving of cultures and the Native American
tendency to attribute some value and prestige to European firearms.
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CHAPTER 5
RECONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK
Primary Source Evidence
Benjamin Church, a prominent English military figure, was commissioned to find
Philip as the war waned, and he recruited Sakonnet allies. With their help, Church's
company breached the hitherto impenetrable swamps of New England.292 Church was not
the first to employ Native American allies against the enemy; Connecticut forces had
relied on the Mohegans, Pequots and Niantics since the beginning of the war.293
Church's Sakonnet allies versed him in wilderness warfare. The Sakonnets
insisted that silence was essential when in pursuit of the enemy; the English had a
tendency for leather shoes, thick pants and conversation, which contributed to their
frequent discoveries by the Native Americans, who were silent and deft in the New
England forests.294 Philbrick suggests that “perhaps the most important lesson Church
learned from the Sakonnets was never to leave a swamp the same way he had entered it.
To do otherwise was to walk into an ambush.”295
In The History of King Philip's War by Benjamin Church, he details the Native
American-style war tactics he used during the attack on Philip and his followers on
August 12, 1676.While tracking Philip, Church and his colonial soldiers and Native
American allies used the method of secret and sudden attacks to take “great Numbers of
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them Prisoners.”296 Church is flexing in his telling of his military maneuvers and
heroism, but he evidences the influence of aboriginal warfare and strategies through his
narrative.
Church wrote that he “always Marched at a wide distance one from another,
partly for their safety: and this was an Indian custom, to March thin and scatter.”297
Church also learned:
That the Indians gain'd great advantage of the English by two things; The Indians
always took care in their Marches and Fights, not to come too thick together. But the
English always kept in a heap together, that it was as easy to hit them as to hit an
House. The other was, that if at any time they discovered a company of English
Souldiers in the Woods, they knew that there was all, for the English never scattered;
but the Indians always divided and scattered.298

In his pursuit of Philip, Church positioned himself at one end of a swamp where
the Wampanoag sachem took refuge, and ordered his men to distribute themselves
around the perimeter; he was met with “a great number of the Enemy, well armed,
coming out of the Swamp. But on fight of the English they seemed very much surprised
and tack'd short.”299 Though the Native American enemy was well-armed, they were
surprised and thus disadvantaged. Church then threatened an overwhelming attack by his
hidden soldiers if the enemy fired a shot. Church wrote: “They seeing both Indians and
English come so thick upon them, were so surprised that many of them stood still and let
the English come and take the Guns out of their hands, when they were both charged and
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cock'd.”300 The element of surprise was an extremely potent and effective tool; even
when the two sides were matched in terms of weaponry. If one group was caught off
guard, it rendered their weapons less effective because they were overpowered and
limited in their actions due to the military tactic of surprise and ambush executed by the
enemy.
Philip eluded capture in that initial forest confrontation, and the colonial army
retired to rest for a few days; Church then received information that Philip had made
camp at Mount Hope; according to an informant, Philip was “in the south end of the
miery swamp just at the foot of the Mount.”301 Early on the morning of August 12, after a
few days in pursuit, Church and his company finally approached Philip's camp. Like he
did previously in a forest combat situation, Church stationed his company, made up of no
more than 24 men, around the periphery of the swamp where Philip and his men had
made camp.302
Church's company crawled on their bellies as they approached Philip's camp, and:
Capt. Church knowing it was Philips custom to be fore-most in the flight, went
down to the Swamp and gave Capt. Williams of Situate the command of the right
wing of the Ambush, and placed an English-man and an Indian to-gether behind
such shelters of Trees, &c. that he could find, and took care to place them at such
distance as none might pass undiscovered between them...303

In the eastern portion of the swamp, two of Church's men met Philip as he attempted an
escape. According to Church, Philip attempted to escape and ran towards two of Church's
men waiting in ambush. Though the Englishman's musket misfired, a Pocasset ally
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named Alderman shot and killed Philip as he ran.304 The waiting men: “let him come fair
within shot, and the English mans Gun missing fire, he bid the Indian fire away, and he
did so to purpose, sent one musket bullet thro’ his heart, and another two inches from it;
he fell upon his face in the mud and water with his gun under him.”305 Church’s account
shouldn’t be misconstrued as a flawless narrative of the war; it comes with its own set of
biases. Church’s account, also, shouldn’t be considered a precise re-telling of the final
and fatal attack on Philip. It evidences Church’s use of aboriginal military tactics but in
terms of physical re-creating the attack, it’s not precise.306

Archaeological Evidence: RI 5

On Brown University Mount Hope property is a monument commemorating the
approximate location of King Philip’s death. The monument reads: “In the ‘Miery
Swamp’ 165 feet W.S.W. from this spring, according to tradition, King Philip fell,
August 12, 1676, U.S. This stone placed by the R.I. Historical Society December, 1877.”
Kevin Smith, deputy director and chief curator at the Haffenreffer Museum of
Anthropology at Brown University, said the site (RI 5) is not actually the site of Philip’s
assassination but merely the site where a monument was placed in the nineteenth century
to commemorate his death.307
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Plaque at RI 5. Photo by author, August, 2018.

The Rhode Island Historical Preservation & Heritage Commission was
established in 1968 by an act of the General Assembly to develop a statewide
preservation program under the umbrella of the United States Department of the
Interior’s National Park Service. The RIHPHC is charged with many responsibilities,
including the conduction of state-wide surveys of historic properties, recommending
places for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places and regulating
archaeological exploration on state lands.308 RI 5 is one such site; the earliest record of RI
5 in the RIHPHC archives dates to August, 21, 1975. The site was surveyed that year,
according to the state archive for the site. Many of the entries into the state archaeological
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site files in the early years of RIHPHC contain sites already known by researchers to
exist; several located on Brown University’s Mount Hope property were reported to the
RIHPHC in the 1970s. The site where Philip allegedly died, known as the “Cold Spring
Site,” was among them.309 In fact, many of the first few hundred entries in the state’s site
files, housed at the RIHPHC, are previously recorded sites from nonprofessionals, strings
of new sites from academics or cultural resource management surveys, or previously
recorded sites from the Haffenreffer Museum or the Rhode Island Historical Society
recollections or records.310 RI 5 lies on Brown University property and is located ¼ of a
mile off the museum access road to the right; the 1975 site file mentions a locked gate
and fence, but in August 2018 there was no locked gate at the threshold of the forest path
to reach the monument. On site, near the monument, is a stone structure, used by Indians
in the 1970s for commemorative celebrations.311

Smith, an archaeologist, conducted a non-invasive metal detector survey on
portions of Brown’s property in 2003-2004. He was searching for concentrations of
metals that could help identify old cabin sites or areas of formal dumping.312 A concern
then was that Mouth Hope was a major village site from the time of King Philip’s War.313
There was no recovery of materials from locations where archaeologists discovered subsurface metal.314 It was difficult for the archaeologists to identify any real concentrations
since 350 years of Euro-American farming and occupation on the property had resulted in
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a continuous scatter of garbage across the landscape.315 But, the area around the spring
did have a relatively large concentration of metal “hits,” which hinted to the possibility of
a Contact Period occupation. To test the possibility, archaeologists put in three 1x1 meter
test units (two on the terrace above the spring and one in an area of very high-density
“hits” in the low-lying swampy area to the side of the spring). The terrace test units
demonstrated the metal “hits” there were from nails associated with nineteenth century
glass and ceramics; at considerably greater depth in one of the test units, archaeologists
found quartz debitage in sandy deposits, suggesting limited prehistoric occupation or
activity near the spring. Nothing implied occupation or activity there in the seventeenth
century. The test unit in the swampy area to the side of the spring’s outlet had even more
nails and a significant concentration of late nineteenth-century wine glass fragments and
eating vessels.316 There was nothing there to indicate prehistoric or contact period activity
but archaeologists were not able to excavate deeply as the unit flooded.317 In the units
excavated, there was no evidence to indicate any activity around the spring during the
time of King Philip’s War. The surface layers of the three units opened were consistent
with partying and picnicking around the site of the Historical Society’s monument ca.
1870s-1890s.318 Smith suspects the nails on the terrace reflect the location of structures or
shelters for picnics while the concentration of glass and ceramics in the swamp area was
a picnic dump.319 Archaeologists saw limited suggestions of much earlier reduction of
quartz linked to prehistoric quarrying of the white quartz seams on Mount Hope; its
depth, though, seemed inconsistent with anything as recent as the seventeenth century,
315
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and given the access that the Wampanoag had to European metal tools by the time of
King Philip’s War, it seems unlikely that this work with local quartz would date to the
seventeenth century.320 With early, buried evidence of prehistoric and historic activity, RI
5 is more than the site of a monument. But Smith wrote that nothing suggests or confirms
the location of a battle site. There are several sites of archaeological and historical
interest on Brown’s property, according to Smith, including two on the western side of
the property that he dated to the sixteenth- seventeenth century and one on the northeast
edge of the property that produced a Late Woodland Levanna point made from Attleboro
Red Felsite. There are memories, too, of an Archaic site (5,000 to 3,000 years old) that
was washed away in a hurricane in the 1950s.321 All of these sites document Native
American presence and activity on the Brown University Mount Hope property, but they
do not suggest or confirm a contact period village or battle sites on the property. Aside
from Smith’s work from 2003 to 2010, there were other surveys and some digging done
in the 1950s and 1970s, but no inquires revealed any information to support a village or
battle site on the Mount Hope property.322 With no archaeological evidence to confirm RI
5 as the site where King Philip fell, the exact location can continued to be guessed and
chased but may forever remain a mystery.323
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The Archaeology of War

Dr. Kevin McBride et al. conducted a battlefield archaeology survey of the
Nipsachuck Battlefield and Nipsachuck Ceremonial Area in North Smithfield, Rhode
Island (a site approximately 30 miles away from RI 5 in Bristol) and published the results
in a technical report in 2013. Known as the Second Battle of Nipsachuck, the attack took
place early in July, 1676; a force of 300 Connecticut dragoons and 100 Pequot and
Mohegan conducted a successful surprise attack on a Narragansett camp of at least 170
people. 125 Narragansett were killed in the attack.324 Approximately 150 battle-related
and domestic objects within the 67-acre battlefield were identified. The researchers
reasoned that the nature and distribution of the battle-related artifacts would reveal the
avenues of attacks by the colonists and their allies.325 If battle-related objects were
recovered from RI 5, it might be possible for researchers to trace the battle, like McBride
et al. did. Since no such objects have been recovered there yet, researchers must heavily
rely on colonial sources, which aren’t entirely accurate in regards to battle re-structuring.
McBride et al. conducted the battlefield analysis on the Second Battle of Nipsachuck, in
part, to “understand how the weapons and tactics of the various combatants influenced
the battles.”326 A battlefield analysis of RI5 that yielded physical evidence would have
been invaluable to this research. The lack of archaeological evidence at the site of King
Philip’s death (wherever it may be) results in an understanding of the past that, though
still valid, is less complete. McBride et al. provide a rich and nuanced analysis of the
Second Battle of Nipsachuck by adding archaeological evidence. Their battlefield
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analysis relied heavily on the nature and distribution of round lead shot (or musket balls)
across the battlefield.327 At the Mattity Swamp battlefield the direction of fire could be
determined for nineteen of the musket balls; direction of fire is a “very significant factor
in reconstructing the nature, movement, and progress of a battle.”328 No such artifacts
were recovered at RI 5 in the years of various surveys and test pits.
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CHAPTER 6
MEMORY
Lepore argues that how wars are remembered can be just as important as how
they were fought and first described.329 War generates acts of narration, and this narration
can take the form of oral traditions or written traditions. Both war and the words used to
describe it serve to define the geographical, political, cultural, racial and/or national
boundaries between people.330 Memory, then, is especially important to people who
didn’t have written traditions. DeLucia writes: “Memory has its own logic and faculties
for recalling, forgetting, or silencing the past, and it merits serious consideration as a
form of historical knowledge, particularly among communities that have valued
nonwritten strategies for transmitting the past to posterity.”331 Though memory and the
disclosure and dissemination of that memory via oral tradition is a valid version of
history for the Native Americans of New England, their extermination and dislocation at
the close of King Philip's War affected how their version of the war is remembered today.

In the century that followed King Philip's War, colonists erected few permanent
monuments. DeLucia argues that this hesitance stemmed from Protestant wariness about
graven images and also financial depletion after the war, “and it resulted in a principally
invisible commemorative landscape in which settler verbal accounts animated key
points.”332 DeLucia argues that Rhode Islanders created a “memoryscape” that
recollected their area's engagements with Narragansetts and Wampanoags, and Zachariah
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Allen (1795-1882) exemplified these tendencies.333 Born in Providence and educated at
Brown University, Allen built his fortune through textile enterprises, yet he remained a
devoted champion and advocate for the past. The Rhode Island Historical Society was
founded in 1822, and Allen became president of the organization. Allen “was a tireless
speaker and writer on historical topics, organized group outings to notable sites, and was
a principal architect of public memory during the state's colonial revival.”334 The colonial
revival was a late nineteenth-century movement that encouraged interest in America's
colonial heritage, especially on the East Coast; it tended to foster a sanitized view of the
past “that seemed reassuring and morally sound in an era of rapid social
transformation.”335 Allen paid homage to the grave site of Benjamin Church in Little
Compton and personally funded renovations for the crumbling grave stone. The
grassroots efforts in the centuries proceeding the end of King Philip's War and before the
twentieth century to memorialize the New England landscape contrasts with more
concerted efforts by historical societies and, more notably, Native American tribes in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The lag in the erection of Native Americansponsored monuments speaks to their struggle to regain lost territory and power since
colonization.

DeLucia argues that land is a “potent vector of memory production” and she takes
a place-based approach to “restore a dimension of cultural practice typically unseen and
unheard.”336 She notes that locals and travelers in South County, Rhode Island, gravitate
to the “Great Swamp Fight” monument in South Kingstown, which memorializes the
333
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massacre of Narragansetts that took place in South County, Rhode Island on December
19, 1675. Colonial militia shot or burned to death hundreds of Narragansetts and
Wampanoag refugees.337

Great Swamp Monument, South Kingstown, Rhode Island. February,
2018. Photo by author.
The road that leads to the monument is called Great Swamp Monument Road, off
of Route 2 in South Kingstown. The monument's plaques are broken and some of the
stone inscriptions are dull. According to one plaque, the monument was erected by the
Rhode Island Society of Colonial Wars in 1908. The plaque reads: “Attacked within their
fort upon this island the Narragansett Indians made their last stand in King Philip's War
and were crushed by the united forces of the Massachusetts Connecticut and Plymouth
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Colonies in the ‘Great Swamp Fight’ Sunday 19 December 1675.” With such an
inscription, the monument acts less like a somber and sympathetic ode to the massacred
Narragansett and Wampanoag people. The plaque's language calls attention to the victors
and touts their military prowess in “crushing” the ambushed Narragansetts and
Wampanoags. If the Native Americans emerged from King Philip's War victorious, the
language on the plaque would be different.
The “Great Swamp Fight” monument is one example of a physical structure in
New England that was facilitated by non-native groups. A marker at Burr's Hill park in
Warren, though, was facilitated by Wampanoag people in May 2017; a group from
Martha's Vineyard, specifically.338 The marker reads: “While memories of this land spark
the fires of his spirit, let the smoke rise in prayerful respect to Wampanoag Massasoit
'8SÂMEEQAN' Yellow Feather Esteemed Leader of the Wampanoag Nation his vision
and 1621 treaty upheld fifty-four years of peace with early English settlers.” Along with
the installation of the marker, the Wampanoags also reinterred the artifacts recovered
from previous excavations in the early twenty-first century, which were previously under
the ownership of various libraries and museums, including the Heffenreffer Museum and
George Hail Free Library.339 The marker's language does not mention the reinterment of
the artifacts, nor is there any physical indication where exactly in the park they are
buried. This may be to protect from looters and it could also stem from a desire to respect
the dead. Writing in 1935, Princess Red Wing, Narragansett tribal historian, notes the
tendency of Native Americans in New England to refrain from or minimize a narration of
death: “New England Indians believed death to be the 'great mystery' and did not
338
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speculate upon it or explain it to their young.”340 Lepore notes that changing names was
not uncommon for the Native American tribes of New England, and uttering the name of
a dead person was considered a grievous wrongdoing.341 In 1665, Philip himself traveled
to Nantucket to kill a Native American who had spoken the name of his dead father,
Massasoit.342

Burr’s Hill. Marker commissioned by the Wampanoag
Tribe. Leaning against it is a library loan of Macmillan
Encyclopedia of Native American Tribes by Michael
Johnson; other small tokens like orange feathers and an
American flag are nearby. February, 2018. Photo by
author.
The language of the marker honors Massasoit, the leader of the Wampanoag
people before his son, Philip, took control. It refers to the “memories of the land,” or the
scars the war left behind. Though they cannot be forgotten, the language of the marker
notes that peace existed before the carnage, and Massasoit's successful treaty guaranteed
those fifty-four years of peace. The “Great Swamp Fight” monument was erected in the
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early twentieth century by a non-Native American group and touts colonial heroics,
victory and utter defeat of an unsuspecting group of Narragansetts and Wampanoags. The
Burr's Hill marker was erected about 100 years later by a group of Wampanoag people
and recognizes a Wampanoag leader that kept the peace with European for years, before
tensions came to a head with King Philip's War. The stark differences between the war
monuments reveal what certain communities choose to memorialize. Lepore is
recognized as the authority on written memory and landscape memory as it pertains to
King Philip’s War. For some communities, wartime glory and victory are
commemorated. For others, it is the calm before the storm that is memorialized in the
landscape, a time before a culture was almost completely exterminated. Winners tout
what they win, and the defeated mourn what they lost. These feelings manifest in
monuments like the “Great Swamp Fight” monument and the Burr's Hill marker that dot
the New England landscape today.
Many remnants of King Philip’s War in Bristol, Rhode Island today coalesce in
the form of street names and modern establishments. Metacom Avenue is a major artery
in the town; King Philip Motors is the name of an auto repair shop on Metacom Avenue.
Some remnants are subtle, while others are overt.343 A statue in Independence Park
depicts a replica of Christopher Columbus’s flagship. A plaque on the statue reads: “In
recognition of Bristol’s cultural diversity and commemoration of the Columbus
quincentennial/The Bristol, Rhode Island Heritage and Discovery Committee/October 12,
1992.” A statue that claims to honor the cultural diversity of Bristol omits any sign of
Native American influence in that diversity; there are no Native American images on the
statue, there is only the colonial ship. It’s also interesting that Columbus’s voyage is
343
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honored over the seventeenth century English inhabitation of Bristol; the colonization of
Rhode Island then and the outbreak of King Philip’s War more directly affected Bristol’s
cultural diversity than did Columbus’s voyage in the fifteenth century. But the Bristol,
Rhode Island Heritage and Discovery Committee may have chosen to commemorate
Columbus’s voyage over the New England pilgrims precisely because it is farther
removed and less personal. The plaque’s mention of cultural diversity is perhaps a noble
attempt at commemorating the Native Americans who lost their lives, but it’s still too
subtle and sterile to be a fair and true honor of the aboriginal inhabitants.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Almost 400 years removed, it’s easy to detach ourselves emotionally from the
people who experienced the war. The man referred to today in scholarly journals and
books today is known as Philip, but he wasn’t actually Philip at all; he was called
something else by his people. The Wampanoag sachem had a family and a life, and it was
interrupted by outside forces that eventually killed him. Those forces also killed almost
everyone he knew and took ownership of his land. Such wounds are too deep to fix with
state names, park names and statues. The acknowledgements and honors help, but they
don’t erase the past and the future it shaped. It’s hard not to dwell on it. To think how
things could have been if only people then made different choices.

Charles Hughes, a Korean War veteran, writes: “While we do not experience the
manifold buzzing confusion of life as a story, we do require the ordering and sequencing
of events for understanding; we need narrative to make sense of our experiences.”344 To
make sense of the natural world and cultural events, people use language- a tool that
creates borders and categories in life. Sometimes language fails to express feelings
adequately, especially the pain and violence of war. Jill Lepore argues that when people
cannot name their suffering: “reality itself becomes confused, even unreal. But we do not
remain at a loss for words for long. Out of the chaos we soon make new meanings of our
world, finding words to make reality real again.”345 For people, language can be
expressed verbally or with the written word. Written narrative is held in high esteem
344
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perhaps because it makes tangible something that is not. It also lasts longer than its
creator, and so it serves as a piece of the person who created it and left it behind. Writing
doesn't die.The English colonists reflected, argued, and memorialized with written
narration. As Lepore has extensively researched, more than 400 letters dated from June
1675 to August 1676 survive in New England archives alone; there are more than 30
editions of 20 different printed accounts. The Native Americans who were defeated in
King Philip's War did not document their experiences on paper, they spoke them.346
There were a number of factors which led to the colonial victory in King Philip's
War, but the adoption of Native American war tactics was more influential than a
discrepancy in weapons. The colonists and the Native Americans were pretty evenhanded when it came to their military hardware. The Native Americans already had a
sufficient arsenal before the Europeans arrived in the New World, and they were skilled
in mitigating the shortcomings of their aboriginal weapons. Quickly, too, the Native
Americans adopted European guns and supplemented their weapon caches. The colonists
were the victors in King Philip's War, though, because they adopted military tactics that
were suitable for the New England wilderness. This coupled with the English tendency
for total warfare and the lifeline to England for provisions guaranteed that the colonists
would use the tactics ruthlessly and without limitation and thus secure the war victory.
Rhode Island monuments reveal the intricacies of war and memory for the communities
that were involved. King Philip's War left scars that are still felt by some and seen by
many today.
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